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times the lessons learned were small,
such as the discovery that landing net
rungs spaced too far apart posed a
significant danger to debarking troops.
Some elements of the TORCH landings
touch on current questions. For example,
although the Saint-Nazaire and Dieppe
raids had demonstrated previously the
inherent difficulty in conducting an
amphibious assault on built-up areas,
TORCH would feature several efforts
along these lines. The most dramatic of
these was an attempt to land U.S. troops
from HMS Walney and HMS Hartland
(the former U.S. Coast Guard cutters
Sebago and Pontchartrain, respectively)
directly onto the moles of Oran Harbor.
Both vessels quickly were identified as
hostile and ran an intense gauntlet of
French fire until sunk. In contrast, an
attempt was made to sail USS Dallas, a
vintage destroyer carrying seventy-five
specially trained assault troops, six miles
up Port Lyautey’s Wadi Sebou waterway
to carry out an attack on a critically important all-weather airfield. The effort,
despite experiencing significant delays,
succeeded. In an ever-urbanizing world,
the viability of direct amphibious assaults may be open to debate once again.
O’Hara rightfully points out that TORCH,
in the main, failed to deliver hoped-for
results. It would take five months to
achieve victory in North Africa, not the
three weeks anticipated. The operation
did nothing to ease the plight of the
Soviet Union and the Mediterranean
remained contested waters. The African
campaign drew men, matériel, and
shipping away from efforts to support
a direct invasion of Europe. TORCH
resulted in the total occupation of
France by Germany and the intentional
scuttling of the French fleet at Toulon.
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None of these results, according to
O’Hara, inflicted real loss on Italy and
Germany. However, in the opportunity
to identify and resolve amphibious
challenges and as a beginning to the
development of a truly combined
strategic command, TORCH was of
value. If, as O’Hara claims, TORCH also
ensured that France would not become
a true ally of Germany, the strategic
benefit may have been significant.
TORCH sheds some welcome light on
a campaign that too often is passed
over. Scholars and lay readers alike will
find the book useful. While O’Hara
has performed yeoman service in
providing this detailed account of the
amphibious portion of the campaign,
perhaps his greatest contribution
is to restore the reputation of naval
forces that, far from offering token
resistance, fought with courage and
tenacity, often against superior odds.
RICHARD J. NORTON

How the War Was Won: Air-Sea Power and Allied Victory in World War II, by Phillips Payson
O’Brien. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ.
Press, 2015. 640 pages. $35.

This book provides a detailed reexamination of the main contributory factors
leading to Allied victory in World War
II. In many ways the book’s argument
is not so much new as it is a revision
of the revisionists. During the Cold
War the narrative was largely that the
Western Allies had triumphed over
Germany and Japan with some help
from the Soviet Union. That narrative
was challenged at the time, and with
more success after the end of the Cold
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War by revisionist historians who
placed an increased emphasis on the
role of Soviet ground and air forces in
the defeat of Germany. The Russian
front, it was argued, was where the
bulk of Germany’s forces was engaged
and, as far as the revisionist narrative
went, defeated by the Soviet Union. Dr.
O’Brien, a reader at the University of
Glasgow, challenges that argument with
a wealth of data and looks at the war in
more global terms. He argues that the air
and sea forces of the United States and
the British Empire played the decisive
role by preventing “the Germans and
Japanese from moving” (p. 16).
How the War Was Won provides a broad
array of detailed information discussing
the enormous industrial contribution
of all sides. Indeed, the author’s analysis
of all this information makes a compelling case for his argument. Yet there is
something missing: it is difficult to see
the link between cause and effect. One
can see such a link better regarding the
war against Japan, but in the case of the
war in Europe the author does not show
clearly the link he claims between air
and sea power causing immense damage
to Germany’s war economy and Soviet
troops wandering around Berlin in 1945.
I suspect that the Soviet forces’ killing
and wounding of millions of German
combat troops might have something to
do with this, for without the physical removal of German soldiers from the Soviet Union’s route to Berlin Hitler might
not have felt the need to commit suicide.
Now, there is no denying that Allied
air and sea power contributed to Allied
victory in Europe; the argument seems
to be to what extent they did so. Thus,
this book is welcome for the depth of
detail it provides as fodder for such a

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss3/15

6854_BookReviews copy.indd 149

B O O K R E V I E WS

149

debate. That this reviewer is not entirely
convinced of the author’s arguments
does not make this a bad book; it is in
fact a very good book, and an extremely
welcome addition to the literature on
World War II. It provides an enormous
amount of information and analysis
about the role of air and sea power,
which furthers our understanding of
the reasons for Allied success. That it
causes the questioning of the current
orthodoxy is to be applauded, as
greater understanding often results
from challenges to the status quo.
This book should prove of great benefit
to advanced students of World War
II, and it is particularly pertinent for
specialists interested in current U.S.
national security needs. Given the
friction that exists among the United
States, China, and Russia, the book
provides an opportunity to think about
how the U.S. armed services should
structure their forces for any future
conflict with these potential adversaries.
Dr. O’Brien’s book should be read by
any sailor, marine, or airman invested
in a budget fight, because “the only way
to ‘win’ a war is to stop your enemy
from moving” (p. 488). That argument
seems a particularly pertinent one when
looking at the problems of Southeast
Asia or the Baltic or Black Sea regions.
NICHOLAS MURRAY

A Military History of Japan: From the Age of the
Samurai to the 21st Century, by John T. Kuehn.
Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2014. 299 pages. $75.

Japan is at an inflection point. Depending on how particular peoples and
nations view this enigmatic country, it

2

4/21/17 2:29 PM

